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COLLUSIVC PRICING UNDER THE COMMERCE ACT 1975 * 
Introduction 
Collusive pricing involves the practice of two or more 
competitors going into agreement regarding the prices and 
terms at which they will buy or sell goods and services.
1 
For the purposes of thi s paper however, only selling agree-
ments will be considered.
2 For the agreement to have any 
impac t however , requires the competitors to conunand a 
significant share of the particular market. Leaving aside, 
monopoli stic and oligopolistic markets, most competitors 
individua lly do not possess a significant share of the market . 
As such, trade associations often represent the protagonisL 
of collusive pricing agreements (CPAs ). Such pricing 
agreements c onfer the power to influence prices , usually 
upwaras . Consumer demands for better prices and terms are 
resiste d. Firms will not operate according to forces of 
demand and supply, resulting in a poor allocation of resources. 
In sum, it de stroys the virtues of competi~ion.
3 The 
recognition of this inherent anti-competitiveness of CPAs 
has resu~ t e d in the adoption of an i 11 ega l per sc approach 
toward s the m, in the Unite d States and Australia.
4 There i s 
an absolute prohibition in both tho se countries, on all forms 
of collusive pricing, with v ery few exceptions. In contrast , 
our system adopts a pragma tic case by case method of evaluating 
such agreeme nts against a public interest test. This paper 
will examine the legislative provisions and administrative 
procedures relating to collusive pricing control under the 
Commerce Act 1975, with a view of identifying any possible 
defects in our approach and methods to increase the efficiency 
of collusive pricing control in New Zealand. 
History of Control 
Modern legislative control of collusive pricing started 
with the Trade Practices Act 1958. Earlier trade practices 
legislation dealing with some collusive pricing
5 was rendered 
ineffective by_ the decision of the Privy Council in Crown 
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· 11 · 6 Mi ing Co v. R. CPAs were not prohibited under the Trade 
Practices Act, but registration of such agreements were 
required.
7 The Commissioner of Trade Practices and Prices
8 
might then conduct investigations into the practice
9 Upon 
b l . . 10 h d 
. d . 
a report y t1e Commissioner, t e Tra e Practices an Prices 
. . 11 . h l k . . . , 12 Commission mig t t1en ma e appropriate restraining oraers 
if the practice is contrary to the public interest.
13 By 
far, the most substantial change in control of collusive 
pricing came in the 1971 amendment to the Trade Practices Act .
1 4 
Under that amendment , all parties to a collusive pricing agree-
ment in force on the 1st April 1972 were required to seek the 
approval of the Commission to the agreement and further , all 
agreements entered into after that date had to have the prior 
approval of the Commission before they can operate. In ]975, 
the new Labour Government enacted the Conm1erce Act. It 
repealed the Trade Practices Act but the collusive pricing 
provisions were carried forward into the new Act and remain 
substantially the same . 
Under the Commerce Act, collusive pricing is 
1 d l5
 b h . . lG un ess approve y t e Commerce Commission. 
Commission must grant its approval if the effect 
prohibited 
The 
of the 
practice is not contrary t o the public interest in accordance 
with S.21 of the Act.~
7 The prohibition covers agreements 
or arrangements coming substantially within S.23 (1) (b), (d ) 
18 
or (e }. There are however, a number of exemptions to the 
prohibition.
19 The most important and significant exemption 
is that relating to the provision of professional services .
20 
It is difficult to see any fundamental difference b e twe en 
restrictive practices engaged in by the business community 
and restrictive ethical codes followed by the professions.
21 
There is nothing unique in the provision of professional 
. d h . h b . 1 . d 
22 
services an t e exemption oug t to e serious y examine . 
Elements of a Collusive Pricing Agreeme nt 
What exactly constitutes a collusive pricing agreement 
or arrangement for the purposes of S.23(1} (b), (d) or (e)? 
23 
The meaning of" 11 agreement II or· "arrangeme nt" would undoubtedly 
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include a contract or a legally enforceable agreement, 
but it would also include something less than that. If 
there is co~nunication between th e parties, and some mut
ua l 
intention to follow a common course of action, the n an 
agreemen t would be held to exist. 
Dalglish J said:
24 
Thus in Master Grocers 
"The expression [agreement or arrangement ] in my view 
would include anything in the nature of an understanding 
b etween two or more persons to follow a common course 
of action. It is not necessary that there should be 
any l egally enforceable obligation or any element of 
compulsion to observe that common course of action 
arising from the possible imposition of a penalty or 
sanction or from t..he fear of possible consequences." 
The learned judge wen t on to say that parallel pricing o
n 
its own is not sufficient to establish an agreement or a
rrange-
25 
ment. This must be so as the necessary communication
 and 
mutual intention would not be present . Similarl~ geograp
hical 
zone pricing by itself would not indicate an agreement a
s the 
competitor with a location advantage will set the price 
for 
that location such that a pattern of pricing will develo
p. 
However if all the membe rs of a trade association adopt 
a 
uniform zone pricing system throughout large areas despi
te 
large differences in costs, collusion can be inferred fro
m 
the circumstances. 
Price leadership (where the prices of a dominant trader 
are followed by smaller competitors on their own accord 
in 
order to survive} on its own , would also not connote an 
agreement because the necessary communication and mutual
 
intention wouid not be present . The prohibition extend
s to 
any agreement coming "substantially" within S.23 (1) (b), 
(d) 
o r (e ), but it is hot exactly clear what "substantially"
 
-- . .. 26 requires . 
Information arrangements may make full market informatio
n 
available to competitors, making parallel pricing likely
, 
but unless they involve an agreement or recommendation a
s to 
~~ice~t they will not fall within the prohibition. It 
is 
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clearly legitimate for businessmen to seek to be well 
informed about market conditions and it is hardly inco
mpatible 
with healthy competition. Nevertheless, informa tion 
arrangements have often been used as a cloak for collus
ive 
pricing. By virtue of S.23(3), the prohibition extends
 to 
recommendations made by a trade association to its mem
bers 
relating directly or indirectly (through terms of sale)
 
to prices, margins or pricing formulas , notwithstanding
 any 
statement that compliance is up to the members ' own cho
ic@. 
Since such recommendations constrain bargaining on pric
e, 
it was clear that the y interfere d with the free operati
on of 
the competitive market. What exactly then , constitute
s a 
d ' 
I d ' 27 h d ' 
recomrnen ation '? In Contractors Fe era tion, t c Fe 
e rc:ttJ_on 
removed all specific references to "recommended rates" 
from 
the Blue Book containing parame ters for rate calculatio
n 
purposes, and had also made it clear that contractors w
ay 
charge any rate they think fit and that any rates shown
 in the 
book may not always be appropriate in a particular case
. 
The Commission however, held that it was an indirect 
recorrunendation relating to prices to be charged and to 
the 
pricing formula to be used c:ts provided in S.23(3). 
The Approval Process 
Applications for approval of CPAs must be made to the 
C · . 
28 h' h h f th t th E . ommerce Commission, w ic ten re ers - em o e •x
aminer 
29 
of Commercial Practices for investigation and report. 
If, 
after investigation, the Examiner is convinced that the
 practice 
is contrary to the public interest, he is obliged to n
otify 
the applicants and endeavour to reach an agreement on 
a 
d . 
b h .- . 30 
recommen ation to e put tote Commission. In any 
event, 
he must ·present a report to the Commission stating (am
ongst 
other things) the grounds on which the practice is con
trary to 
-the public interest and his reconunendation_ as to the o
rder or 
such action that the Commission should make or take. 
The 
Commission is required to hold an inquiry on all applic
ations 
contested between the Examiner and the applicants.
31 Where 
an agreement between the Examiner and the applicants is
 
~eache~, or where he is ~n doubt as to the public inte
rest, 
or ·where he comes to the conclusion that the practice i
s not 
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contrary to the public interest , the Commission may dispense 
. h . . 32 h . . .wit an inquiry. T e Comnussion had neve r held an 
inquiry , where the Examiner h ad recommended approval of the 
CPA after conciliation. This is understandable given 
the practical difficulties the Commission would face if it 
should choo se to hold an inquiry . Any such proceedings 
before the Commission would not be completely adve r sarial 
and it would be difficult for the Conm,ission to decide . 
Therefore, the Examiner 's opinion on just what constitutes 
the public interest is as i mportant as that of the Commission. 
A right of appea l against a decision of the Commission lie 
to the Administrat ive Divis.ion of the High Court .
3 3 The 
d ec ision of the Court on any appeal is final and conclusive.
34 
There were 376 appl ications (as at 31st March 1983) 
registered for approval since 1972 , under S.18A of the 
35 
Trade Practices Act 1958. These applications were carried 
forward into the Commerce Act and deemed made under that Act .
36 
Where the app lication for approval was made before 1st January 
197 3 , the practice is allowed to continue, subject to any 
1 · 
imposed conditions, pending the determination of the Commission . -· 
Of the 376, 253 were not approved , or were withdrawn or lapsed, 
3 8 were approved , and 85 are yet to be determ.ined .
3 8 Except 
for several applications before the Commission , the rest of 
those yet to be determined are stil l with the Examiner awaiting 
invest igation and report, some of which dates back to 1972. 
There were 28 applications registered for approval since 1st 
November 1975 (as at 31st March 19 83 ) under S.29 of the Commerce 
39 Act. Of these, 8 were not approved, or were withdrawn , 
or lapsed, 4 were approved and 16 are yet to be determined.
40 
The established trend , is for applications to be not approved, 
withdrawn or lapsed rather than approve d, particularly those 
under S.29 of the Commerce Act . It is unlikely that this 
trend will change in the future . 
. Unlike applications mdde under S.18A of the Trade 
Practices Act, applications unaer S . 29 of the Commerce 
Act are no ' allowed to operate until approval is 
granted. Given that most CPAs are likely to be 
• 
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contrary to the public interest, applicants under S. 29 faced 
the difficult task of demonstrating public benefits of a 
practice that does not yet exist . 41 For that reason, it 
is unlikely that there will be many approvals under S.29 of the 
Commerce Act . 
The current approval process is both tedious and pain-
stakingly slow. The delav is primarily the result of collusive 
pricing applications being accorded a low priority in the 
allocation of resources to investigations of trade practices 
42 
and related matters under the Comme rce Act. In terms of 
allocation of priorities, practices involving offences against 
Part II (Trade Practices ), or relevant to the administration 
of Part II of the Act have highest eriority. Within this 
group, prohibited practices (§.48-54)~ 3
 have first priority, 
followed by practices prohibited unless approved by the 
Commission (§27 , 28) 44 i. e . including CPAs. Due to 
limited resources , investigations into complaints alleging 
contraventions of the Act will not be undertaken unless there 
is substantive preliminary evidence of a possible offence 
. 'f' . . f h t 45 1· t' f agaJ.nst a speci -ic provision o t e Ac . App ica ions ·or 
approval of CPAs are accorde d second priority . Within this 
group, priority wil l be given to applications under S.29 
of the Commerce Ac t (over that under S.18A of the Trade 
Practices Act). As to individua l applications, the 
significance o f any economic impact is an important consider -
ation. The allocation of priorities appears to be a 
realistic approach to promote the effective and efficient 
use of available resources. But it must be questioned why 
prohibited practices are given tl.e_ highest priority when there 
are very few prosecutions involving offences each year. 
One would have thought that greater emphasis ought to be 
given to collusive pricing practices as t0ey are for more 
widespread and pervasive, and of significant impact on the 
market. 
The low priority accord~d to CPA applications can 
• 
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principally be attributed to a few factors. The most 
significant factor is, the severely limited resources of 
the Examiner. The Examiner , himself an officer of the 
46 
Department of Trade and Industry, possesses no staff of 
his own as such, but relies on staff under the Commerce 
Division of the Department. Commerce Division personnel, 
which are organised into industry groupings , besides being 
responsible for the administration of the Commerce Act, 
are also responsible for the administration of a host of 
other price control and surveilance regulations.
47 
Resources are spread thinly over a wide area and to add 
to that , it is the Secretary of the Department that determines 
the allocation of resources. Thus, for instance , when the 
Price Freeze Regulations 1982/142 was enacted last year , 
fir st pr iority was given to the administration of the 
r egulations, with the result that trade practices investigat-
. . . . . 48 . l ions rece ive minimum attention. There i s current y, 
only 8 full time staff handling trade practices investigations 
in Wellington.
49 Each CPA application requires the gathering 
and evaluation of stacks of documents and materials. The 
Commissic;:m in contrast, has 8 membe rs performing a much 
simpler task. If th e approval process is to be speeded up, 
the provision of staff directly accountable to the Examiner 
ought to be given serlous consideration. 
Over the years, the government emphasis had b een on 
. 1 h h h d 1 f · · so price contro rat er tan t e eve opment o competition. 
The argument often put forward to justify the neglect of 
collusive pricing is that, since most of the goods under 
collusive pricing control are also under price control, 
CPAs have no impact whatsoever (i. e. no possibility of abuse) 
That justification is true to a certain extent only. Price 
control maintains prices ·and prevents unj_us tified increases, 
but at the same time it operates against competitive pressures 
bringing prices down. · Price control could also unwittingly, 
foster or even c~eate CPAs. The whole question comes down 
to whether government policy should be directed towards price 
control or the development of competition. 
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The transitional provision in S.30(1) makes matters 
worse. It allows CPAs registere d b e fore 1973 to continue 
to operate while awaiting determin a tion. As such, parties 
to the agreement have absolutely no incentive to cooperate 
voluntarily and conciliate with the Examiner.
51 This makes 
investigations by the Examiner more difficult. 
There is simp ly no pre s umption that CPAs are contrary 
to the public inte r e st under our s c heme of control. Enormou s 
resources would h a v e to be committe d in trying to esta blish 
detrimental affe cts of a practice , whi.ch may or may not result 
in a Commission orde r. A cha ng e o f p resumptio n would h e lp 
in alleviating the curre nt delay. Lastly, the recent decision 
52 
of the High Cou r t in HANf P.ppeal, and the Commissio n in 
Contra ctor s Feder a tio n, complicates the ma tter furthe r by 
requiring the Ex a mine r to c omply \•.' ith a hig h e r standa rd of 
proof, which is grossly incompatible with the making of 
economic decisions. This point will be developed further, 
later in the paper. 
Public Interest Test 
The public interest test containe d in S.21 of the 
Conunerce Act represents the core of the whole approval . 
system. After establishing the existence of a CPA, 
the Examiner must prove on the balance of probabilities 
that the practice has one or more of the "eight effects" 
listed in S.21. Section 21 (1) provides : 
For the purposes of this Act , a trade practice shall be 
deemed to be contrary to the public interest only if , 
in the opinion of the Conunission , the effect of the 
practice is or would be -
(a ) To increase the cos~s relating to the production, 
manufacture , tran sport , storage, or distribution 
of goods, or to ma intain such costs at a higher 
level than would have obtained but fer the trade 
practice; or 
(b) To increase the prices at which goods are sold or 
to maintain such prices at a higher level than 
would.have obtained but -for the trade practice; or 
• 
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(c) To hinder or prevent a reduction in the costs 
relating to the production , manufacture , transport, 
storage, or distribution of goods , or in the prices 
at which goods are sold ; or 
(d) To increase the profits derived from the production , 
manufacture, distribution, transport , storage , or 
sa l e of goods , or t o maintain such profits at a 
higher level than would have obtained but for the 
trade practice ; or 
(e) To prevent competition in the production , manufacture , 
supply, transportation , storage , sa le, or purchase 
of any goods ; or 
(f) To reduce or limit competition in the production , 
manufacture , supply , transportc1tion , storage , sale , 
or purchuse of any goods ; or 
(g) To limit or prevent the supply of goods to consumers ; 
or 
(h) To reduce or limit the variety of goods available 
to consumers or to alter , restrict , or limit to the 
disadvantage of consumers, the terms or conditions 
under whi ch goods are offered to consumers . 
Only the first six effects are most relevant to collusive 
pricing investigations. 
From the very beginning, under the Trade Practices Act 
1958, 53 it was clear that it is the "effects " of the practice 
that are important, and not the motives of the parties to the 
54 
agreement. So, even if the purpose of the parties 
entering into the agreement i s to fix prices , but conditions 
of the marke t were such that the ir obj e ctive is not capable of 
achievement or realization, the agreement would not be contrary 
to the public interest.
55 The words "is or would be" in the 
opening part of S.21 had bee n held in · Reaiste r ed Hairdressers
56 
to entitle the Commission to have regard to both the present 
and likely future effects of the agreement. 
The provision that is most ofte n invoked by the Examiner 
to support his case is para. (f) [reduct ion or limitation of 
competition] . This is not surprising given the clear anti-
competitive effect of collusive pricing. On the other hand, 
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para . (e ) [prevention of competition] is seldom invoked as it 
had been interpreted in decisions under the Trade Practices 
Act as r equiring an absolute or total elimination of compet-
ition. Since c ompetition i s composed of other components 
(e.g. cost, service, etc. ) besides price competition, it is 
very difficult to envisage a situation where collusive priting 
would r esult in a total e limination of competition. Therefore 
it is not surprising that there has never been a finding by the 
Commiss ion of a CPA preventing competition. In Stock & Station 
57 
Agents (No.l) , it was held that only one component of 
compet it ion. need to be reduced or limited, to bring it within 
para. (f ). In most cases it would be price competition. 
Thus., in Stock & Station Aaents {No.l) and HANz;
8 price 
·competition was held to have been reduced or limited by the 
CPA. The earlier cases under the Trade Practices Act {e.g. 
Fencing Materials, Registered Hairdressers and Master Grocers) 
place d considerable emphasis on price competition. In both 
Registered Hairdressers and Master Grocers, it was held that 
the r educ tion in price competition had a further flow-on effect 
of les senning competition in other fields.
59 Under the 
Commerce Commission, the importance of price competition was 
. . l 1 h . d 6 O k t. t {N l) simi ar y emp asise . In Stoc & Sta ion Agen -s o . , 
the Commission held that S.21 ( 4) (a)6 \ mplicit ly states that . 
for there to be effective competition, there must be price 
competition. Inevitably, to d e termine the effects on 
competition would involve an analysis of the market impact of the 
CPA. This would involve, as held in Fencing Materials, 
con sidering the proportion of the traders adhering to the 
agreement and their share of the particular market . 
Most of the decisions of the Commi ss ion where effects 
on costs, prices or profits are established involve s the 
second limb of para. {b ) [maintaining prices] and the second 
limb of para. {c) [hindering or preventing a reduction in 
prices] .62 Both paragraphs seem to cover the same effect, 
, , , • I , 63 
and indeed that is the Commissions view. 
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It has been suggested that para. (c) does not contain 
the qualification ''at a higher level than would have obtained 
but for the trade practice'' , but the distinction had never 
been drawn by the Conunerce Conunission. The double coverage 
for practical purposes, would seem to benefit the Examiner 
as by showing more effects being breached should weigh in 
favour of the Examiner 's case. 
In Registered Hairdressers and Master Grocers, the Appeal 
Authority was willing to infer increased prices as a consequence 
necessarily following from reduced competition. That however, 
is not the case with increased costs . In HANZ, the Commerce 
Commission refused to hold that reduced competition necessarily 
results in increased costs. The Commission required that 
independent proof be put forward. The nature of costs is such 
that it involves many factors bes ides price, and complex 
accounting evidence is beyond the expertise and resources 
available to the Examiner. As a result, the provision 
relating to costs is seldom invoked. Similarly with profits. In 
Stock & Station Agents, (No.l)the Com.mission refused to hold that 
profits were necessarily increased as a result of prices being 
maintained. 
The effects must also be direct. It cannot be extended 
to cover consequential increases. It must relate to the goods 
and services that is the subject of the CPA, and not to any 
64 
other goods or services at large . In Woolbrokers, where 
the collusive pricing agreement relates to the issue of a 
minimum scale of fees and charges for woolbroking services , 
counsel for the Examiner contended that the practice under 
inquiry was capable of being caught within S. 21 (1) (a ) as 
having "by inference, detrimental effects on the costs of 
wool production." The Conunission rejected the argument , 
holding that the costs referred to in S.21(1) (a) is not 
intended to be related to a prior or subsequent remote 
activity. 
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When the Examiner had established one or more of the 
detrimental effects listed in S.21(1), the agreement will 
be presumed to be contrary to the public interest. The 
applicants may rebut that presumption by justifying their 
practice in terms of S.21(2). Section 21(2) provides: 
Notwithstanding that the Commission is of the opinion 
that the effect of any trade practise is or would be 
any of those described in subsection (1) of this 
section, that practice shall not be deemed contrary 
to the public interest if the p a rties to the practice 
satisfy the Commission that , in the particular case, -
(a ) The practice has or would have effects of demonstrable 
benefit to the public sufficient to outweigh any of 
the effects described in subsection (1) of this 
section, which, in the opinion of the Commission 
the practice has or would have; or 
(b) Even though the _Commission is of the opinion that the 
effect of the practice is or would be one or more of 
those described in ... subsection (1) of this section , 
that effect or effects is or are not unreasonable. 
Some of the benefits that had been held to outweigh 
detrimental effects from a collusive pricing practice, 
includes savings in administrative costs of calculating 
prices (Master Grocers, HANZ Appeal), public facilities for 
accommodation and meals (HANZ Appeal), and savings in overseas 
65 funds (Electric Lamps). Genuine costing assistance, in the 
form of pricing formula to small businessmen is also considered 
a benefit (Wellington Master Plumbers, 66 Wanqanui Master 
- 67 68 ?lumbers, Funeral Directors ) . Benefits unlike detrimental 
effects have been held, not to be limited to the direct 
consequence of the collusive pricing practice. Thus, in 
S. t k St . ( 1) h . . . d 6 9 . oc & at ion Agents No. , t e Commission sa1 : 
11 In this case the public interest can be taken as embracing 
the interests of the farming community, who are direct 
consumer s of the service, the national interests in maintaining 
efficiency and productivity in relation to industries which 
provide considerable employment opportunities and earnings of 
overseas exchange and the individual interests of many New 
Zealand cLtizens whose livelihood depends on the totality of 
the industry involved ." 
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On the basis of such vague benefits , the Com.mission went on 
to hold that the total abandonment of the CPA would b e to 
worsen ''present levels of the promotion of consumer interests , 
efficient and effective development and improvements in 
productivity." 
If any collusive pricing practice is to be approved 
under S.21(2), it is more likely to be under the "not 
unreasonable test" rather than the "public interest balancing 
t est ". The former test appears to be an easier test to 
satisfy than the latter. Thus, for instance , the joint 
marketing of drycleaning services (NZ Dryclearners
70 ) and an 
agency arrangement between trading banks (NZ Bankers Associat~ 
ion 7:} were approved on the ground that the agreements were not 
unreasonab le. Applying the public interest balancing test , 
it would be extremely difficult to find any public benefit 
ari sing out of the practice . 
be private in nature. 
Any benefits would essentially 
Developing Trends in Collusive Pricing Control 
There were 17 approvals of CPAs under the Commerce 
Commi ssion .
72 The Commission h eld only 5 inquiries to date.
73 
They however, relate only to 4 practices.
74 Of tho se 4, 
the Examiner rec ommended approval of 2 ,
7 5 with modifications, 
but as not all those interested agreed with the recomme ndations, 
a Commission inquiry was held. The other two did not have t he 
Examiner's sanction for approval - HANZ and Contractors' 
Federation . Approval was granted in Contr2ctors' Federation 
but not HANZ. However, on an appeal to the High Court, 
h 
-.--, I d • • d 76 
t e Commissions ecision was reverse . 
Of the 17 approvals, only 5 were not subject to any 
d . t. 77 con i ions. The rest of the approvals were subj ect to 
. d. . 78 varying con itions. 
A typical set of conditions often imposed is as follows:
79 
(i) Tha t, where the maximum amounts al l owed to be charged 
under any scale of fees and .charges issued in terms 
[AV/ llB:-:Anf 
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of this approval are subject to any control under any 
statute or regulations, the said scale of fees and 
charges and any alteration to the scale of fees and 
charges, must comply with any relevant provisions 
of such control legislation; 
(ii) That , where.the maximum amounts allowed to be charged 
under any scale of fees and charges issued in terms 
of this approval are not subject to control under any 
statute or regulations,other than this condition , the 
said fees and charges and any alteration to the scale 
of fees and charges must be submitted for approval by the 
Commerce Commission; 
(iii) That any scale of fees and charges issued in terms 
of the approval be clear ly headed to show that the 
prescribed fees and charges are the maximum which 
may be charged ; 
(iv ) That the Association inform its members that they are 
free to charge lower fees without the risk of incurring 
sanctions of any kind , such information to be attached 
t o or contained in any scale of fees and charges issued 
to members in terms of the approval . 
(v) That the Association , a t the first opportunity, a lter 
its rules to comply with the terms of this decision 
and, i n the meantime, forthwith inform its members that 
the rules are current scale of fees and charges or 
to be read as being subject to this decision. 
(my emphasis) 
The above conditions were reconunended by the Examiner (and 
accepted by the Conunis s ion) to modify a CPA that was found 
to be contrary to the public interest, into one that wouJ:<l 
no longer h ave that effect.
80 
The question that must be asked is, how effective are 
those conditions in a me liorating the effects that are contrary 
to the public interest. The "maximum price allowed" would 
be in most situations b e come the going market price.
81 
Even though, it is also a condition that members may charge 
less, they are unlikely to do so unless there is severe 
competition between them. Furthermore, the setting of those 
conditions would inevitably require policing which would put 
further strain on already limited resources. 
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In fact, in Stock & Station Agents (No.2) , 82 the 
Association breached the conditions imposed but the breach 
was not djscovered by the Examiner but by Federated Farmers, 
the interest group. The Commission revoked its previous 
approval and substituted a more restricted approval. In 
this case, there is a strong watchdog interest group but 
there are many situations where there are no such groups 
and possible breaches could go unnoticed but would involve 
an offence under the Act. 
What is of more concern is the imposition of the 
condition that prior approval of the Commission be obtained 
before any alterations can be made. This would necessarily 
involve the Commission in a price control function, not 
unlike that in Part IV of the Commerce Act. This preference 
for contra] through regulation can impe de the development 
of competition. 
83 
The Commerce Commission I s "regulatory approach" 
contrasts sharply with its predecessor I s II competition approach". 
Under the Trade Practices and Prices Commission, no modifications 
were ever recommended for a practice held contrary to the public 
interest. 
The Commission is also required to recommend that any 
goods or services that is the subject of the inquiry be 
subject to price control under S.82, if it comes to the 
opinion that that would be in the public interest. 84 The 
Commission however , has not made any such recommendation in 
relation to a collusive pricing application. Price control 
should only be used as a last resort where conditions of 
competition do not exist or, where there is a likelihood of 
abuse. 
The Examiner on his part, had also often demanded 
assurances or undertakings from the parties· to the agreement 
before he would recommend approval. Such assurances or 
undertakings are usually designed to limit the scope of the 
h . . . 85 h f d agreement. T us, in L1qu1gas t ere were a ew un er-
takings by the parties, one of which was not to engage in 
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. . 86 
any territorial agreements. Such assurances or 
undertakings are not legally enforceable as such, but 
if they are breached, it would form the basis for the 
Examiner to seek a revokation or an ame ndment of the approval 
under S.29 (8). 
There had b e en only one a ppe al, relating to collu s ive 
pricing, to the Administrative Division of the High Court 
i.e. HANZ Appeal. As a result of th e Chief Justice's 
decision, it now appears that the Examiner has to comply 
with a higher requirement of proof in establi s hing the 
para. (a) to (d) effects. Th e Chie f Justice r e j e cte d 
the Commission's finding that the CPA had the effects 
described in the 2nd limb of S. 21 (b) [ma intaining price s] 
and (c) [hinde ring or preve nting a r eduction in price s ], 
on the ground that there was "no real direct evide nce" 
to support the Commission's conclusions. The Commission 
in that case had evide nce before it showing th a t the 
association members command 35 % of the market share for 
off-premises consumption (the subject of the CPA). The r e 
was 95% adherence by members of listed prices for normal 
bottle store sales and virtually 100 % adherence of bulk 
and wholesale sales. 
There was also evidence showing that two non-member hotels 
in different centres charged prices approximately 3.5 % to 10% 
lower than the Association's hotels in the same centres. 
Also prices charged by members in Auckland , Wellington and 
Christchurch were between 10.7% and 12.3% higher than prices 
in Dunedin where price lists were not issued. Based on such 
statistics, it is difficult to reach a decision other than 
that the CPA had the effects claimed by the Examiner and 
accepted by the Commission. 
The decision is anoroalous in a few respects. Prevention 
of competition (total elimination of competition) was not an 
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effect advanced but the Chief Justice conside red it as 
well. Thus, after stating several r e levant matters , h e 
.d 87 sai : 
"In the result , for those reasons alone , the impact of 
r educed compeLition in the sales of liquor by the Hote l 
Association members as may ensue from adherence t o price 
guides cannot have any great sig.:2_~ficance in the prevention 
of competition in the industry as a whole." 
:(my emphasis) 
The Chief Justice furth e r said; 88 \ 
"There was virtually no evidence before the Commiss i on 
.of the impact of the absence of the price guides 
could make on competition within the i ndustry and it 
would be quite wrong to ass ume thc1t i f pr ice guides were 
abolished any increc1sed measure of competition would result 
in tha t it would necessari]y be of benefit to the public ". 
(my emphasis ) 
Two criticisms can be made of that statement. 
the requirement for evide nce is not feasible. 
Firstly , 
The Examiner 
would h ave to gathe r evidence on a marke t which does not 
exist as such . Surely, the prese nt effects would b e a good 
indication of the likely future effects . Under the Trade 
Practices ·Act , the Appeal Authority had even held that a 
practice could be contrary to the public inte rest solely on 
its likely future effects .
89 Secondly, the Court clearly 
failed to recognis e the inhe rent anti-competitiveness of 
collusive pricing and the benefits of competition. The 
maintenance of r easonabl e prices was held to be a bene fit, 
when numerous decisions of both, tne Appeal Authority under the 
Trade Practices Act
90 and the Commiss ion under the Comme rce 
Act; 1 had consistently held that whether a practice is contrary 
to the public interest or not does not depend on the reasonabl e -
ness of the price. The Chief Justice in rejecting the 
judgment of the Commission on the significance of the market 
shares, clearly substituted its own opinion for that of the 
Commission. Although, legally there is nothing to prevent 
him from doing so , the question arises whether it is appropriate 
for him to do so especially when the Commerce Commission is a 
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s pecially c onstituted b ody composing of persons wi th 
s pec i a l k nowl edge on economic ma~ters . In my opinio n 
tha t is a r ole tha t the Cour t shou l d avoi d taking . Hampton 
ac c ura t e l y sums up t he af t ermath of t he HANZ Appeal , wh en he 
'd 92 s a i : 
"Wha t i s of more concern , h owever i s t he possibl e impact 
o f the Hl\NZ Appeal decision on the future course of 
c ompe t ition po l icy . Th e Chief Justice ' s emphasis on the 
n eed for direct proof to show a detrimental effect on prices , 
hi s uncritica l acceptance of al l eged public benefits and his 
f a ilure t o ana l yse in any detail the ant i -competitive effec t s 
of t h e price guides make t he decision a most unsatisfactory 
one . I f followed , the HANZ decision cou l d sound the death-
kne ll for any form of effect ive con trol over r estrictive 
t r ade practices in N. Z. " 
The a u thoritat i ve v a lue of the HANZ Aopea l decis i on 
was p u t t o t he t est in Contractors ' Federation , before the 
Commiss i on . It was the f i rst t ime that the evidence of 
the Examine r was t ota lly r e j ec t e d. The Commi ss ion h e ld 
tha t the e ffects we r e not e stablish e d d ue to the l a ck o f 
independe nt e vidence . Although the s t a ti s tics indica ting 
the l e vel of adhe r e n ce we r e l arge ly outdated a nd no t 
comprehensive , on e thing wa s howeve r clear, that is the 
diffe r e nce b e t ween the Blue Book r a t es and the go i n g ma r ke t 
rate was a stronomi ca l. The Examiner pushed ve r y hard the 
fact that the s ole purpose ?f the Blue Book was to fix prices . 
The Commis s ion r e j e cted that, as the Act is not conce rne d 
with the purpo s e of t he partie s. 
Prima facie , that seems logical since the primary concern 
is whether harm is c a used or not. But for two cogent reasons, 
that approach is fundamentally d e fective . First, it assumes 
that market conditions do not change . Business t r ends can 
operate in a. cyclical fashion with ups and downs. An agreement 
approved during ' hard times' for the reason that it would 
h ave no impact , could become an effective price fixing mechan-
i sm during ' good times '. The Commission should not look at 
the effects or possible effects at any fixed point of time 
but rather over a long term basis . The Appeal Authority 
in Registered Hairdre ssers clearly recognised this fac t o r . 
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Dalglish J, in that case said: 93 
"Another way in which reduction in competition as to 
prices may operate against the public interest is 
that when changing circumstances of a general nature 
would, in conditions of free and open competition , lead 
to a reduction in prices, no such reduction may take 
place. Furthermore, when there is an operative agreement 
or arrangement as to prices to be charged, the possibility 
exists of those prices being increased from time to time 
with less justification, or to a greater extent , than would 
occur in conditions of free and open competition ." 
Thus, even though the Act does not allow the purpose of 
the agreement to be taken into account, there is no reason 
why the likely future effects cannot be considered. 
Secondly, in accordance with sound commercial sense, 
businessmen would not enter into an agreement of that 
nature had they not thought it would have a chance of 
fixing prices. Undoubtedly, this would be looking at 
the 'purpose ' but why shouldn't the 'purpose' be taken 
into account. At the very least it is an attempt to fix 
prices. A change in the legislation would certainly 
reinforce present collusive pricing control. 
Conclusions 
On the whole, it would be unfair to describe the 
present collusive pricing control regime as totally 
defective and unworkable. The Commission, realising 
the inherent anti-competitiveness of such agreements, 
had taken a hard-line attitude towards collusive pricing. 
It would obviously be wise to discourage CPA applications, 
given that they are seldom approved anyway, and thus free 
much needed resources. For that reason, serious consideration 
ought to be given to making CPAs illegal per se. The 
present use of the pragmatic case by case method of control of 
collusive pricing (and other restrictive trade practices) 
should be replaced by the use o:: an absolute prohibition against 
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practices having the .2._urpose or effect of l essening compet-
ition and not just concentrate on the effects on prices only . 
Suitable authorisation on public b enefit grounds could be 
provided . Any effective collusive pricing provisions should 
apply uniformly, including to the provision of professional 
services . The maintenance of professional standards and 
t he quality of professional service does not depend 
on the existence of restrictive ethical codes . Private 
remedies by way of injunction proceedings could be intro-
d uced to lessen the burden on the Examiner . Finally, 
any collusive pricing control regime should refrain from 
continuing to adopt "a regulatory approach " to control. 
This inevitably conflicts with the development of effective 
competition in New Zealand. 
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Footnotes 
* 
1. 
2. 
3 • 
4 . 
This subject was extensively covered in an article 
by Hampton, L. F ., "Co llective Pricing Agreements and 
the Commerce Act 1975," Canterbury Law Review , 1 (1 981 ) 
198 (hereinafter referred to as Hampton ) . 
See also Collinge , J.G ., "The Law Relating to Restrictive 
Trade Practices and Monopolies, Mergers and Take Overs 
in New Zealand (2nd Edn)-" 1982 (hereinafter referred ·to 
as Collinqe). 
Thi s will include agreements between manufacturers or 
wholesalers to impose fixed prices at which retailers 
may sell their goods (resale price maintenance ), but due 
to the constraints of this paper I will not deal with 
them . 
Collusive pricing agreements (CPAs ) can be divided into 
two clas ses. The first category relate to CPAs coming 
within S.27(1) of the Act . These relate mainly to CPAs 
on selling prices or terms. They cannot be carried out 
unl ess approved by the Corrunerce Com.;nis sion . The other 
category cover CPAs on selling prices or terms not within 
the former category, CPAs on buying prices or terms , ~nd 
other CPAs (e .g. aggregated rebates, restriction on resources, 
production and suppJy etc .). These CPAs are just 
examinable trade practices . They are not unlawful and may 
b e carried on unless the Commission orders otherwise . 
No application or notification of any of these CPAs is 
r equired . This paper will concentrate solely on the 
forme r c ategory. Collusive pricing in the context of 
this paper , will be taken t o mean exclus i vely horizontal 
agreements between supplier of goods and services. 
It is not possible within the constraints of this paper 
to undertake any detailed evaluation of the effects 
of competit ion in our peculiar market structure . This 
paper will generally assume the benefits of competition 
in our markets. 
For an excellent exposition of United States law in this 
area, see Areedaand Turner, "Anti trust Law: An Analysis 
of Antitrust Principles and their Applications" , 
(1978). See also Kintner , E.W., "Federal Antitrust Law", 
(1980). 
For the Australian law , see Donald and Heydon, "Trade 
Practices Law'' ., (1 978 ). See also Taperell , Vermeesch and 
Harland, "Trade Practices and Con sumer Protection", 
(1978). 
United Kingdom law in this area is generally quite 
similar to ours, though there are major differences. 
For the United Kingdom law, see Korah , V. "Competition 
Law of Britain and the Cormnon Market", (1982). 
5. e.g. Board of Trade Act 1919, allows the establishment 
of fixed or maximum or minimum, prices or rates for any 
classes of goods or services. 
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8 • 
9 . 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
22. 
[1 927) AC 394 . 
Section 12. 
Departmenta l officer appointed under S .10 of the Trade 
Practices Act 1958. The nc1me was changed to "Examiner 
of Trade Practices and Prices" by the Trade Practices 
Amendment Act 1961, S.2 . 
Section 16. 
Section 17. 
An administrative tribunal set up under S.3 of the 
Trade Practices Act 1958. 
Orders may be made only in relation to practices 
specified in S.19, which include collusive pricing 
agreements. Under S.21, orders may also be subject 
to conditions. 
The public interest test contained in S.20 specify 
"five effects " very similar to the "eight effects " 
in S.21 of the Commerce Act 1975. 
Trade Practices Act 1958, S . 23BB, as inserted by 
the Trade Practices Amendmen t hct 1971, S.12. 
Section 27 (1). 
16. The tribunal replacing the Trade Practices and 
Prices Commission . Set up under S . 3 of the Commerce 
Act 1 975 . 
17. 
18. 
Section 29(4) 
Sect i on 23(1) provides: 
(b) Any agreement or arrangement between wholesalers 
to sell goods ... at prices or on terms agreed 
upon between those wholesalers: 
(d) Any agreement or arrangement between wholesalers or 
r etailers or contractors of any combination of 
p ersons engaged in the selling of goods or the 
p erformance of services, to sell goods, or perform 
services, ... at prices or on t erms agreed upon 
b etween the parties to any such agreement or 
arrangement: 
(e) Any a greement . or arrangement between wholesalers to 
sell goods on the condition that prices charged or 
conditions of sale by retailers shall be the prices 
or conditions of sale stipulated by those wholesa lers: 
Note: Pa-ra. (b) appears to be redundant as the practice 
it deals with is equally covered by p a ra. (d). See 
Hampton, p.208. 
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23. 
Section 27 (3 ) provides the following exemptions: 
(1) Professional fees and charges of the type listed 
in the Second Schedule [ S. 27 ( 3) (a) ) . 
(2) Trade association price lists indicating an 
individual wholesalers 1RPM (individual re sale 
price maintenance) prices . [S . 27 (3) (b) ). 
(3) Trade practices expressly authorised by other 
enactments. [S.27(3) (c)). 
There is no list of professional services covered 
provided in the Commerce Act 1975. The following 
list is obtained from the Price Surveillance Regulations 
1979/82. For practical purposes , these services can 
be deeme d as those covered under the Conunercc Act. 
Professiona l Services 
1 . Services (whether as accountants, auditors, consultants, 
advocates , investigators , or advisers ) performed by chartered 
accountants or chartered accountants in public practice \·1i thin 
the meaning of the New Zealand Society of Accountants Act 1958. 
2. Services of actuaries in their capacity as such. 
3. Services of architects registered under the Architects 
Act 1963 in their capacity as such. 
4 . Services performed by chiropodists registered under the 
Medical and Dental Auxiliaries Act 1966 in their capacity as 
such. 
5 . Chiropractic services , being services performed by 
chiropractors registered under the Chiropractors Act 1960 
i n their capacity as such . 
6 . Dental services , being services performed by registered 
dentists within the meaning of the Dental Act 1963 in their 
capacity as such . 
7. Services performed by dietitians registered under the 
Dietiti ans Act 1950 in their capacity as such. 
8. Services of i nsurance brokers in their capacity as such . 
9. Lega l services , be i ng services performed by practitioners 
wi thin the meaning of t he Law Practitioners Act 1955 in their 
c apaci t y as such . 
10. Medical services , being the provision of medical or 
surg i cal advice or attendance and the performance of surgical 
ope r ations , performed by registered medical practitioners within 
the mean ing of the Medical Prac t itioner s Act 1968 . 
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11. Services performed by medical technologists registered 
under the Medical and Dental Auxiliaries Act 1966 in their 
capacity as such. 
12 . Nursing services , being services performed by nurses 
registered under the Nurses Act 1971 in their capacity as such. 
13. Services performed by occupational therapists registered 
under the Occupational Therapy Act 1949 in their capacity as 
such . 
14. Services of optometrists or dispensing opticians 
registered under the Optometrists and Dispensing Opticians 
Act 197 6 in their capacity as such and of optical dispensers 
in their capacity as such. 
15. Services of professional engineers or techno logists, 
being persons practising as consultants in the field of -
(a ) Civil engineering: 
(b) Mechanical , aeronautical , marine , electrical , or 
electronic engineering: 
(c) Mining, quarrying , soil analysis , or other forms of 
mineralogy or geology : 
(d) Agronomy, forestry, livestock rearing, or ecology: 
(e) Metallurgy, chemistry, biochemistry, or physics: 
(f) Any other form of engineering or technology of a kind 
similar to those referred to in th~ preceding paragraphs 
of thi s clause. 
16. Services of patent attorneys in their capacity as such. 
17. Services of physiotherapists registered under the 
Physiotherapy Act 1949 in their capacity as such. 
18. Services performed by radiographers in their capacity 
as such . 
19. Services performed by real estate agents within the 
meaning of the Real Estate Agents Act 1976 in their capacity 
as such . 
20. Services of sharebrokers licensed under the Sharebrokers 
Act 1908 in their capacity as such. 
21. Services of ship brokers in their capacity as such. 
22. Services of surveyors of land (including surveyors 
registered under the Surveyors Act 1966), quantity surveyors, 
surveyors of buildings or other structures , and surveyors of 
ships, in their capacity as such. 
23. Services performed by valuers of land or of chattels 
in their capacity as such . 
24. Veterinary services performed by veterinary surgeons 
registeted under the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1956 in their 
capacity as such. 
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21. Professional services are not exempted from collusive 
pricing provisions both in the United States and Australia. 
See , Pengilley , W., "The Trade Practices Act and the 
Professions" , 7 Management Forum (March 1981 ) 27 . 
22 . This is in fact one of the recommendations put forward 
b y the Report of the Workina Party to the Minister of 
Trade and Industry on the Commerce Act 1975 (March 1976 ) 
Page 13 of the Report states : 
"The justification for exemption of the fees and 
charges excluded from the provisions relating to 
Collective Pricing Agreements as presently provided 
in the 2nd Schedule should be reviewed by the Corrunission " . 
23 . See Hampton pp. 210-212, or Collinge p.191. 
24 . Re NZ Master Grocers ' Federation's Agreement 
[1961] NZLR 177 , 181. 
25 . Ibid . 
26. In Master Grocers , the overall adherence in the four 
districts of the Association was approximately 84% of the 
l ines stocked. Dalglish J ., held that an agreement to sell 
84% of grocery lines at list prices and freedom to sell 
1 6% of the lines stocked at prices other than list prices 
c anno t be said to be substantially an agreement to sell 
only at list price . However , the learned judge went on to 
c onsider the matter district by district. In the Auckland 
a nd ~hristchurch districts , the agreement related to 86 . 87% 
and 92 . 91% adherence respectively. In Wellington and 
Dunedin districts , the agreement related to 74 . 13 % and 
82 . 53% adherence respective l y . The learned judge held 
that in the former two districts the agreement is sub-
s tantial l y an agreement to se l l only at list prices . 
Therefore , it wou ld seem t hat an adherence of 85% o r more 
wou l d r esult i n a finding that the agreemen t was one coming 
substantially with in the specified paras . I t is difficult 
t o see any basis for holding 85% as the cut - off point . 
Late r c ases came to be decided on a c ase b y case basis 
without a ny spec i fic refe r ence for a ny numerical cut - off 
point. (Th e u se o f the word ' o n ly ' exacerbat ed the 
proble m with ' subs t antial l y '.) 
27. Re An App l ica t i on by NZ Contractor s ' Federation (Inc .), 
Decision No . 56, 27th October 1 98 1 (unreport ed ). 
28. Section 2 9 (1). 
29. Se ction 29 (2). 
30. Se ction 39. 
31. Section 41 (1). 
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33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
26. 
Section 41 (1). 
Section 42. 
Section 45 (4 ). 
Commerce COITL.'Tlission Report for the Year ended 
31st March 1983. 
Section 29(3) 
Section 30 . 
Supra n.35 . 
Supra n.35. 
Supra n.24. , n.35. 
The Examiner will also have the similar difficulty 
of proving the detriments . 
Departmental guideline s distribu t ed to Comme rce 
Division personnel. Made available by courtesy of 
Mr J.R.A. Stevenson , Director of Business Practices , 
Commerce Division, Department of Trade and Industry . 
S.48 
S.48A 
S.4 8B 
S. 49 
S.4 9A 
S.50 
S.51 
S.5 2 
S.53 
S.54 
- Collective tendering 
- Pyramid selling scheme s 
- Misrepresentations regarding home-operated 
businesses 
Collective bidding at auction 
- Supply of trading stamps 
- Refusal to sell goods or services unless 
other goods or service s are also purchased 
- Hoardii1g, etc. 
- Black marketing 
- Mandatory trade-ins prohibited 
- Profiteering in goods or services 
S.27 - Collective pricing agreements 
S.28 - Individual resale price maintenance . 
45. Supra n.42. 
46. Section 18 (1) (a ). 
47. 
48. 
49. 
e.g. Price Surveillance Regulations 1979/82 
Price Freeze R~gulations 1982 /142. 
Interview with Mr Stevenson. Supra n.42. 
Ibid. 
50. e.g. Board of Trade (Price Investigation) Regulations 
1939/62; The Price Stabilisation Emergency Regulations 
1939/122.; Control of Prices Emergency Regulations 
1939/275; Control of Prices Act 1947; Part IV of the 
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52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
27. 
Commerce Act 1975. 
Some would argue there had been a decisive shift 
away from price control with the election of the 
National Government in 1975. It is true that many 
commodities had been removed from the Positive List 
of Controlled Goods and Services , but the recent 
enactment of the Prize Freeze Regulations 1982/142 could 
hardly inditate a shift in that direction . 
Under S .126, it is however an offence to refuse to 
produce documents/books, or furnishing false information,etc 
to the Examiner . 
Re HANZ Appeal . Unreported judgment (High Court , 
Wellington M326/78 , 4th March 1980 ) . 
An addendum to the judgment was issued on 2nd April 
1 981 . 
Under the Trade Practices Act 1958 , the public interest 
te st is contained in S.20 , which lists " five effects ", 
the first four of which contained the word "unreasonably ". 
Under the Commerce Act, the "not unreasonable" test is 
incorporated together with the public interest balancing 
t est into sub-section (2 ) of S.21. 
e.g. In re Wellington Fencin_g Materials Associa.tion ' s 
Agreement ,Decision No.3 of the TPPC , 7th September J9S9 
(un reported) , the Commission held that the public interest 
in collusive pricing does not depend on the purpose of 
the prices fixed. 
In In re the Passenger Agency Agreement of the 
Au stralian and New Zealand Passenger Conference , 
Decision No . 14 of the TPPC , 1st February 1963 
(un reported ) and In r e Kempthorne Prosser ' s New 
Zealand Drug Co . andSharland & Co ., Decision No .1 5 
of the TPPC, 6th March 1963 (unreported ), the 
Commission was clearly over-concerned with the motives 
of the parties getting into the agreement . Both the 
deci sions of the Commission were reversed on appeal to 
the Appeal Authority. Dalglish J., in both appeals, 
emphasised the importance of the "actual effect " o f the 
practice. 
Re NZ Council of Reqistered Hairdressers' Agreement 
(1961] 161. 
Re An Application by NZ Stock & Station Agents Association 
(No. l) (1979) l NZAR 532. 
Re An Application by the Hotel Association of NZ 
Decision No.28, ·28th June 1978 (unreported). 
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Thus, for instance, in Registered Hairdressers' 
Dalglish J. said at p.173: 
"There are various fields in which competition 
may exist in hairdressing. There may be competition 
in cleanliness and hygiene, efficiency, style, 
incidental services and price ... But , where an 
arrangement exists whereby the same price is charged 
for hairdressing whatever the state of hygiene and . 
cleanliness, whatever the efficiency of the hairdresser 
and whatever amenities are provided for the customer , 
h airdressers may well be discouraged from improving their 
premises, their efficiency and the amenities which they 
provide. If so, competition in fields other than price 
will be lessened as a result of the reduction of 
competition in the field of prices." 
E.g.,In Stock & Sta_tion Agents (No.l ) and IIl\NZ. 
Section 21 (4) (a) states that the Commission shall 
be guided by the need to secure effective competition 
in industry and commerce in New Zealand, when 
considering whether any effect in paras (e) or (f) 
is not unreasonable. 
E.g., In Stock & Station Agents (No.l) and HANZ. 
This is evident in Stock & Station Agents (No.l) 
where at para.41 the Conunission said : 
"It may be possible, semantically, to draw a distinction 
between the phrases to "maintain the prices" and "to 
hinder or prevent a reduction in the prices" but the 
Commi ssion considers that for all practical purposes 
in the circumstances of this case , they can be t aken 
to mean the same thing." 
64. Re An Application by NZ Woolbrokers' Association, 
Decision No.30, 2nd August 1978 (unreported ) 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
In re the Distribution of Electric Lamps, 
Decision No.10 of the TPPC, 22nd August 1961 
(unreported) . ' 
Re An Application by Wellington Master Plumbers & 
Gasfitters & Drainlayers Association , Decision No.58, 
18th November 1981 (unreported). 
Re An Application by Wanganui Master Plumbers Gas-
fitters & Drainlayers Association, Decision No. 59, 
18th November 1981 (unreported). 
Re An Application by Funeral Directors' Association 
of NZ, Decision No. 64, 16th February 1982 (unreported) 
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para 76 . 
Re An Application by NZ Drycleaners Ltd, Matwen 
Enterprises Ltd and G. Kline Ltd., Decision No. 66 
31st March 1982 (unreported) . 
Re An Application by NZ Bankers' Association, Decision 
No. 63 , 16th February 1982 (unreported). 
See Appendix 
Decision Nos . 27 , 28 , 30 , 51 and 56. 
Decision 51 dealt with the breach of a conditional 
approval granted under Decision 27 (Stock & Station 
Aqents ). 
Stock & Station Agents 
Woolbrokers - Decision 
Supra n.52. 
See Appendix. 
- Decision 27, 51 . 
30. 
78. ibid . 
7 9. 
80. 
Imposed on Decision 30 (Woolbrokers ) . 
This approach ought to be contrasted with that taken 
by the Australian Trade Practices Commission . In its 
Information Circular No. 3 , the Commission took the 
view that the great majority· of recommended price 
agieements inhibit or diminish competition . This 
was so notwithstanding that: 
(1 ) the price agreement consisted of "recommended " 
or "guideline " prices only; 
(2 ) there was no obligation or undertaking to comply 
with the recommendations made; 
(3 ) there was no attempt to police or follow-up 
the recommendations made ; 
(4 ) the prices were recommended-by an association and 
individual mambers had no direct hand in the 
calculation of the recommended prices; 
(5 ) the prices were recommended by the association on 
the basis of costing or other calculations by a 
party outside the association ~or·example an 
accountant or the secretary of the association ). 
-· - , 
~ L, 
I 
si. 
82. 
s 3. 
84. 
85. 
86. 
8 8. 
30. 
~his was th~ view adopted by Federated Farmers in 
Stock & Station Agents (No.l). They lodged a 
complaint aleging that there were stil CPAs 
precluding the negotiating of fees and charges 
below scale. The Commission, pursuant to S.29(8), 
revoke d the previous approva l and substituted a 
more restricted approval. See Decision No. 51. 
Re An Application by NZ Stock & Station Agents 
(No.2), Decision No. 51, 7th Ma y 1981 (unreported). 
It is often argued that the Commerce Act 1975 aligns 
the trade practice s provisions with the price control 
provisions through S. 21 (3) (b) . That provision 
requires the Corunission in its d etermination whether 
prices under a CPA is "unreasonable" to conside r what 
the price would be if subjec t to price control under 
S. 8 2 of the Act. But this doe:~ not in any way indicates any 
preference for price control. 
Section 25. 
Re An Application by Liquigas,  Decision No. 49, 
17th December 1980 (unreported). 
Examiner's Report to the Commission. 
~0p~a n.52, at p.7 of the addendum tb the judgment. 
Ibid. 
89~ E.g., In Registered Hairdressers. 
90. 
92~ 
E.g., In Fencing Materials, Registered Hairdressers, 
and Re Ass~ciated Bookselers of NZ's Agreement [1962] 
NZLR 1057. 
~~~  In ~tock & Station Agents (No.l). 
pp 251-252. 
(l.96J_J 161; 173-. 
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Appendix 
An Analysis of the Approvals Granted by the Corrunerce Commission 
Decision 
No . 
ib 
13 
22 
Applicant 
NZ Automotive & 
Cyc le 1-Jholesal-
ers I Assn. Inc. 
NZ As sn of Ship-
ping Agts. 
Gilbarco Ind. 
NZ Ltd. 
Conditions I mposed Re l ating 
to Pricing 
i) Subj ect to any pr i ce control 
~equirements if applicable 
1) Subject to price control 
requirements if applicable 
2) Prior approval required for 
alterations 
3) "Maximum only " 
4) Free to charge less 
*27 NZ Stock & 
Station Agts 
1) Subject to price 
requirements if 
control 
applicable 
-32 
48 
NZ Woolbrokers 
~nterflora Ra:cific 
Unit Ltd ·. 
2) Prior approva l required for 
alterations 
3) "Maximum only" 
4) Free to charge les s 
1) Subject to price control 
requirements if applicable 
2) Prior approval required for 
a.iterations 
J) "Maximum only" 
4) Free to charge less 
Auckland Joinery 1) Prior approval required for 
'Mariufacturers alterations 
·A'ssn 
·Liquigas t) ~P-r -ior approvat required for 
-at tera·tions 
Comment 
Decisio n No. 71 revoked 
approval and substituted 
in its place a rec i procal 
trading agreement. 
Deci s ion No. 7 2 changed the 
"maximum only" to "re:::ornmend 
ed r ates " and also delete 
the prior approva l 
condition. 
Decision No .51* r evoked 
Decision No. 27 and sub-
stituted a more restricted 
approval. 
Some conditions were i mposed 
. but none of them relate 
directly to pricing 
CPA relates to pricing 
formula 
Directive from Minister on 
S. 2A . 
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0 
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Decision 
No. 
*56 
58 
59 
62 
63 
64 
Applicant 
NZ Contractors ' 
Fedn. 
Wellington 
Master Plumbers 
Wanganui 
Master Plumbers 
Nationa l Insurance 
Co. of NZ and CML 
Fire & General 
Insurance 
NZ Bankers Assn. 
Funeral Directors 
Assn . 
66 NZ Drycleaners, 
Matwen Enterprises 
Ltd and G. Kline 
Ltd. 
68 NZ Bankers Assn . 
70 NZ Bankers Assn. 
32. 
Conditions Impose.a Re lating 
1) Prior approval required 
for alterations 
l) Prior approval required for 
alterations 
1) Prior approval required for 
a lterations . 
Where an inquiry was held. 
Comment 
Only condition was that 
Book is to be worded as 
a "guide " only 
CPA relates to "recommended " 
pricing formul a . 
CPA relates to " recommended" 
pricing formula . 
Only condition was that 
there be a written notice 
of any amendment or t ermin-
ation of the CPA. 
CPA relates to "reconunendcd" 
pricing formula . 
Only condition was that 
there be a written notice 
of any alte r ation within 
14 days. 
~ : An inquiry was held in Decision No. 28 (HANZ). The Commission declined 
approval but the decision was reversed on appeal to the High Court. 
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